The long-standing tradition of recognising Italian citizenship through jus sanguinis (right of blood) is facing a critical moment of reflection and potential reform. This historic principle, which has granted Italian nationality to descendants of Italian emigrants across the globe without temporal limitations, is now under constitutional scrutiny. A recent ruling by the Bologna Tribunal, under the aegis of Judge Marco Gattuso, has brought the matter to the forefront of legal and public discourse, with the Tribunal formally raising the question of its compatibility with the Italian Constitution before the Italian Constitutional Court.
This debate stems from the case of 12 Brazilian nationals seeking Italian citizenship based on their descent from a single ancestor born in 1874 in Marzabotto. Despite having no apparent cultural, linguistic, or tangible connection to Italy, they have relied on their Italian lineage to make this claim. The judge’s ruling questions whether granting citizenship to individuals with such distant ties aligns with the constitutional principles of sovereignty, reasonableness, and the fundamental concept of “the People” as outlined in Italy’s constitutional framework.
Judge Marco Gattuso has drawn attention to the unique nature of Italy’s legal framework, which is one of the few in the world to grant citizenship by descent (ius sanguinis) without temporal limitations. This unrestricted application has sparked significant debate, raising questions about its compatibility with constitutional principles that define Italian citizenship and the concept of popolo. In an increasingly globalised world, this approach has been scrutinised for its alignment with the evolving understanding of national identity and the balance between historical legacy and present-day realities.
The Constitutional Court has now been called upon to evaluate whether granting citizenship solely based on ancestral ties—often spanning several generations—meets the principles of reasonableness embedded in the Italian Constitution and adheres to Italy’s international obligations. This judicial review highlights the tension between preserving Italy’s historical connection to its diaspora and the need for legislative frameworks that reflect the demands of modern governance.
The initiative brought forward by the specialised section of the Bologna Court could significantly reshape the future of Italian citizenship law. Among the potential outcomes is the introduction of temporal limits to the ius sanguinis principle, marking a shift from a purely lineage-based criterion to a more nuanced evaluation of an individual’s tangible connection to Italy. Such reforms could address longstanding concerns about fairness, equity, and the consistency of Italy’s citizenship policies, aligning them more closely with the broader European framework.
A reform of this scale would fundamentally redefine Italy’s relationship with its diaspora, particularly in regions like Brazil, Argentina, and the United States, where many claim Italian ancestry. While the current law has been an essential bridge connecting Italy to its global diaspora, the proposed changes could place greater emphasis on cultural and linguistic ties rather than distant genealogical connections. These adjustments would also aim to mitigate potential abuses, ensuring that citizenship claims reflect a genuine and meaningful relationship with Italy, rather than being driven by convenience or opportunity.
Ultimately, this debate raises fundamental questions about the balance between tradition and modernity. As Italy considers the possibility of revising its citizenship laws, it must weigh its historical commitment to its global diaspora against the need for legal frameworks that reflect contemporary realities. The Constitutional Court’s decision will likely influence not only the legal landscape but also the broader cultural narrative of what it means to be Italian in the 21st century.
The evolving reality, which the Constitutional Court may decide to examine further through additional means if deemed appropriate, is not merely a peripheral consideration. On the contrary, as will be demonstrated, it provides a solid foundation for questioning the constitutionality of the “pure” and unrestricted application of the criterion of descent or filiation.
This issue is underpinned by two key factors: the excessively broad scope of individuals eligible for recognition and the absence of clear limitations in the application of the descent criterion. These factors, coupled with the increasing ease of access enabled by the internet, streamlined procedures, and greater availability of information, now raise significant concerns in two crucial legal areas.
First, there is the issue of compatibility with the constitutional framework as a whole, particularly with the concept of Il Popolo (The People), which, alongside the principles of territory and sovereignty, forms the foundation of the Italian Repubblica. Second, it highlights the delicate matter of compliance with Italy’s international obligations, both those stemming from broader commitments and those specifically linked to its membership in the European Union.
Italian Citizenship Reform: Constitutional Challenges and Broader Implications
The ordinance issued by Judge Marco Gattuso of the Bologna Tribunal on November 26, 2024, has brought to light profound constitutional questions regarding Italy’s recognition of citizenship through ius sanguinis. This principle, deeply embedded in Italy’s legal tradition, currently allows citizenship to be conferred across generations without temporal or generational limits. The case in question involves twelve Brazilian applicants, descendants of a woman born in Marzabotto (in the current Emilia Romagna Region) in 1874, seeking recognition of Italian citizenship solely based on their genealogical ties. This judicial referral to the Constitutional Court raises significant questions about the intersection of law, identity, and national sovereignty.
The applicants argued that they qualify as Italian citizens by virtue of uninterrupted lineage and sought to have their status recognised through judicial confirmation. They requested their details to be entered into the civil registry of Marzabotto, the birthplace of their Italian ancestor. These claims bypassed the consular process, often criticised for inefficiency, with waiting times extending over a decade in countries like Brazil. The applicants disclosed having no cultural, linguistic, or territorial connections to Italy, highlighting the issue’s core: whether citizenship can be granted purely based on ancestry without any tangible link to the country.
Italy’s ius sanguinis principle, codified in Article 1 of Law no. 91/1992, confers citizenship by descent without generational or temporal restriction. This policy has made Italy one of the few countries globally to maintain such expansive criteria, creating a unique but increasingly controversial situation where individuals with no concrete ties to the nation are granted Italian—and consequently European Union—citizenship.
Judge Gattuso’s Constitutional Concerns
Citizenship represents a subjective legal status that signifies an individual’s belonging to a state community and entails a series of rights recognised and guaranteed by law. The Constitutional Court has defined it as a “constitutionally protected legal status that includes a set of rights in both private and public spheres, and particularly, political rights” (Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 April 1975, no. 87, § 2, Legal Considerations).
The Constitutional Court underscores that citizenship is a fundamental legal status, integral to the personal element of the national and state community. It identifies the citizen as an essential part of the popolo (the people), representing a constitutive element of the state. Furthermore, citizenship reflects the principles of sovereignty outlined in Article 1 of the Constitution, linking the exercise of popular sovereignty to the individual’s role in legislative initiatives, justice administration, and direct participation in public affairs.
As explicitly stated during the hearing on 23 October 2024, it is necessary to formally note the existence of serious doubts regarding the compatibility of Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 5 February 1992 (New Rules on Citizenship). Specifically, in the part where it establishes that “A person is a citizen by birth if they are the child of a father or mother who is a citizen,” the absence of any limitations on recognising Italian citizenship through descent raises concerns in light of constitutional parameters derived from Articles 1 (second paragraph), 3, and 117 of the Constitution.
The relevance of this question for the decision in the current case is evident, given that the 12 claimants lack any connection to Italy, apart from a blood relationship with an ancestor, which has been highlighted without restrictions by the aforementioned Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992.
Judge Gattuso raised the issue of compatibility between Article 1 of Law no. 91/1992 and several constitutional provisions:
- Article 1 (Second Paragraph): Declares that sovereignty belongs to the people, linking national identity to the collective exercise of political rights.
- Article 3: Establishes equality and the principle of reasonableness, questioning whether unlimited ius sanguinis adheres to rational legislative criteria.
- Article 117: Mandates conformity with international obligations, particularly the principle of “effective nationality,” which requires a genuine connection between the individual and the state.
The judge underscored that granting citizenship without any territorial, cultural, or linguistic connection risks undermining the concept of “popolo,” a foundational element of the Italian Republic. By extending citizenship indiscriminately, the law dilutes the cultural and political identity of the Italian nation and potentially disrupts the exercise of national sovereignty.
Ius Sanguinis and the Weight of 60 Million Potential Citizens
Italy’s unique application of ius sanguinis, granting citizenship without temporal or generational limits, is under growing scrutiny due to its extraordinary implications. With an estimated 60 million descendants of Italian emigrants living worldwide or even 80 million—more than the population of Italy itself—the sheer scale of potential citizenship claims poses significant challenges. If all these individuals were to claim Italian citizenship, the country would face an unprecedented and unsustainable demographic and administrative burden.
Current data already highlights the strain on Italy’s institutions. Back in 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported over 800,000 pending ius sanguinis applications, and the numbers have only grown since. Consular offices abroad, especially in countries like Brazil and Argentina, are overwhelmed, often requiring 10 to 12 years just to schedule an appointment. The courts are equally inundated; in Venice, for instance, 73% of civil cases in 2024 involved the recognition of citizenship through ius sanguinis. This administrative bottleneck illustrates how the system, as it stands, is ill-equipped to handle the volume of applications, let alone an exponential increase.
Moreover, the implications of recognising tens of millions of new citizens extend far beyond bureaucratic challenges, carrying profound political, economic, and social consequences. Many of these potential citizens lack any meaningful connection to Italy, having no cultural, linguistic, or territorial ties. For a significant number, the motivation to obtain Italian citizenship lies not in becoming part of Italian society, but in gaining access to the privileges of European Union membership, often with the intention of residing in other EU countries. This situation prompts critical questions about the true purpose of citizenship and whether the current framework aligns with both Italy’s national interests and the principles underpinning European Union membership.
The Italian Constitutional Court is currently evaluating whether the unrestricted application of ius sanguinis aligns with key constitutional principles such as proportionality, fairness, and the definition of Popolo (The People). Article 1 of Law No. 91/1992, which permits citizenship by descent without generational or temporal limits, is under scrutiny for its compatibility with Articles 1, 3, and 117 of the Italian Constitution. This lack of restrictions contrasts sharply with the practices of many other countries, where citizenship by descent is generally confined to the first or second generation and often conditioned upon additional criteria such as residency or language proficiency.
The numbers speak for themselves: granting citizenship to all 60 million descendants of Italian emigrants would double Italy’s population, creating insurmountable challenges in governance, resource allocation, and political representation. Such an expansion would disrupt Italy’s social and cultural fabric, as well as its ability to fulfil obligations to its existing citizens. As the Constitutional Court deliberates, it must weigh Italy’s historical commitment to its diaspora against the practical realities of modern governance and the sustainability of its citizenship policies.
In essence, the debate over ius sanguinis is not merely about lineage; it is about the future of Italian identity, the meaning of citizenship, and the Country’s capacity to manage its resources responsibly. Reform is not just necessary—it is essential to ensure that Italian citizenship remains meaningful, equitable, and sustainable in a rapidly changing world.
International Standards and EU Obligations
The principle of “effective nationality,” as established in international law and exemplified by cases such as Nottebohm (ICJ, 1955), emphasises that citizenship must reflect a genuine and substantive connection between an individual and the granting state. Judge Marco Gattuso contends that Italy’s current ius sanguinis framework falls short of this standard, as it grants citizenship to individuals whose only link to the country is a distant ancestral line, often devoid of cultural, linguistic, or territorial ties.
On a European level, the implications of Italy’s expansive approach extend well beyond its national borders. Citizenship in an EU Member State automatically confers EU citizenship, granting access to a wide array of rights, including freedom of movement, residence, employment, and political participation across the Union. Italy’s policies, by potentially granting citizenship to millions of descendants with little to no connection to the country, effectively impose obligations on other EU Member States. This raises serious concerns about proportionality and fairness under EU law, as these new citizens would have unrestricted access to benefits and privileges in other Member States, creating disparities that challenge the cohesion of the Union.
Judge Gattuso also highlighted the tension between Italy’s domestic legislation and its broader responsibilities within the European Union. By extending EU citizenship through an overly lenient ius sanguinis framework, Italy risks undermining the principles of integration and mutual cooperation that underpin the Union. This disconnect could exacerbate friction among Member States, particularly those bearing the economic and social impacts of new EU citizens whose ties to their country of origin are purely formal.
This debate underscores the need for Italy to align its citizenship policies with both international standards and EU obligations. Reforming the ius sanguinis framework to incorporate criteria such as residency, cultural connection, or generational limits would not only address concerns about effective nationality but also reinforce Italy’s commitment to the principles of equity and integration within the European Union.
The Constitutional Flexibility of Citizenship: Adapting to a Changing Society
The concept of citizenship and its connection to the notion of Popolo (The People) has long been the subject of extensive debate. These concepts are traditionally intertwined with the territorial element and the principle of sovereignty, collectively shaping the very definition of the State. At the same time, the notions of citizenship and Popolo are themselves determined by the legal framework. They are both logically antecedent to the State—original elements of its structure—yet also shaped by it, as their substance is derived from the legal system, which provides their regulation and legal framework.
Authoritative legal doctrine unequivocally considers citizenship a matter of constitutional significance. Nevertheless, the Italian Constitution does not provide explicit provisions governing citizenship, nor does it guarantee an absolute right to it. As observed by the Constitutional Court in Ordinance no. 490 of 20–27 April 1988, the Constitution limits itself to stipulating, in Article 22, that “No one may be deprived, for political reasons, […] of their citizenship.” This highlights a focus on safeguarding citizenship rights rather than establishing comprehensive regulations governing their acquisition or scope.
As derived from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, considerations of practicality and appropriateness advised against the inclusion in the Constitution of an articulated and complex set of rules governing citizenship, as such provisions would be subject to frequent social changes. The decision not to include a comprehensive regulation within the constitutional framework for the acquisition, loss, and reacquisition of citizenship is widely regarded as appropriate, given the need for flexibility to continuously adapt to an evolving social reality.
This decision appears even more pertinent in light of the rapid transformation of Italy during the validity of the Constitution—from one of the world’s leading emigration countries to a destination for immigration. The reversal of migratory flows has, as is well known, raised new questions about the very scope of the notions of citizenship and Popolo.
The flexibility envisioned by the Constituent Assembly establishes a framework for the constant adaptation of ordinary legislation to the evolving realities of the Country. This approach not only facilitates responsiveness to social changes but also necessitates a constitutional review, even in cases where the Legislator has failed to amend ordinary legislation to reflect emerging data from social and statistical analyses.
This principle underscores the dynamic relationship between constitutional foundations and legislative action. By embedding adaptability within the legal system, the Constituent Assembly ensured that laws remain relevant and aligned with societal developments, safeguarding the overarching integrity of the constitutional framework. It also emphasises the importance of continuous oversight to prevent stagnation in legal norms, ensuring they respond effectively to the changing needs of the nation.
Citizenship is linked to the People and Republic concepts
The constitutional challenge raised by Judge Gattuso in Bologna stems from the issue of the conditions and limits for recognising membership in the “Popolo” (The People). It must be assessed whether, in light of historical circumstances such as the significant migratory flows of recent history and the phenomenon of globalisation—with its accompanying ease of transportation and communication via the internet—granting citizenship to tens of millions of individuals without any tangible connection to Italy constitutes an unacceptable distortion of the very notion of Popolo upon which the constitutional order is based.
Specifically, the provision in Article 1, paragraph 1(a) of Law No. 91 of 5 February 1992, which states that “A citizen by birth is: a) the child of a father or mother who is a citizen,” comes into conflict with Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which establishes that “sovereignty belongs to the people.” Citizenship, therefore, directly implicates the concept of Popolo, a cornerstone of the constitutional framework.
Citizenship represents both a political right and a fundamental human right, granting individuals the ability to participate, based on democratic principles, in the governance of the society in which they reside. Political participation rights are widely regarded as the core of the concept of citizenship. As noted, while the Constitution affirms that sovereignty “belongs to the people,” it does not provide a formal definition of popolo. This fundamental concept is, therefore, assumed. At the same time, it is evident that citizenship is an essential prerequisite for defining the Popolo. Consequently, any broad or unrestricted interpretation of citizenship risks undermining the foundational principle of sovereignty as tied to the collective identity of the Italian Popolo.
Judge Gattuso’s reasoning raises critical reflections on the conditions and limits for recognising membership in the Popolo (The People) within the Italian constitutional framework. One of the key issues he highlights is whether, in light of modern historical and social developments—such as significant migratory flows and the impact of globalisation, with its enhanced ease of transportation and communication—granting citizenship to millions of individuals with no tangible connection to Italy constitutes an unacceptable distortion of the very concept of Popolo upon which the constitutional order is founded.
This reasoning brings to light several important considerations:
- Citizenship as a defining element of the sovereign People Citizenship is not simply a formal legal status or an individual right; it serves as the cornerstone for defining the Popolo, the sovereign entity upon which the Italian state is built. The Constitution presupposes the notion of Popolo without explicitly defining it, making citizenship a fundamental prerequisite for its composition. Therefore, any unrestricted interpretation of citizenship risks diluting the integrity and identity of the Popolo as envisioned in the constitutional order.
- The relationship between popular sovereignty and citizenship Gattuso’s argument underscores the potential risk of distorting the principle of sovereignty enshrined in Article 1 of the Italian Constitution, which states, “Sovereignty belongs to the People.” If citizenship is granted indiscriminately to individuals lacking real ties to Italy, it could undermine the democratic principle by weakening the cohesiveness of the Popolo as a genuinely integrated and politically engaged community.
- Citizenship as a basis for democratic participation Citizenship is intrinsically linked to the ability to participate in the democratic governance of society. It is not merely a legal entitlement but a fundamental political and human right that enables individuals to take part in the life of the community where they reside. Extending citizenship to those with no meaningful connection to Italy risks undermining the value of democratic participation, which is predicated on active involvement in the national community.
- Reconsidering the criteria for iure sanguinis Gattuso’s reflections suggest a need to critically evaluate the current framework for recognising citizenship through iure sanguinis. In particular, the absence of any substantive requirements—such as residency, knowledge of the Italian language and culture, or active ties to Italy—raises questions about the appropriateness of granting citizenship to individuals solely on the basis of ancestry. Limiting citizenship to those with an effective connection to Italy could help preserve the democratic and constitutional integrity of the Popolo.
- Modern challenges to the concept of Popolo The phenomenon of globalisation, coupled with advances in technology and transportation, has created unprecedented opportunities for individuals to claim ties to distant nations. In this context, Gattuso’s reasoning highlights the importance of safeguarding the concept of Popolo as a cohesive and tangible entity, rather than allowing it to be stretched beyond recognition by a broad and unrestricted application of the citizenship principle.
The way we define citizenship goes to the heart of what it means to belong to a nation, yet the Italian Constitution, perhaps intentionally, does not provide an explicit framework for it. This absence seems deliberate, allowing the flexibility needed to adapt citizenship laws to the changing realities of society. However, the Constitution clearly assumes Popolo and citizenship as core concepts, meaning any law shaping these notions must be closely examined to ensure it reflects the values and principles of the constitutional system.
Judge Gattuso’s reflections strike at something deeper than legal technicalities. They challenge us to think about whether ius sanguinis as it currently stands truly reflects what citizenship should mean today. His perspective reminds us that citizenship is more than a right passed down through ancestry—it’s a bond that ties people to a community, to shared responsibilities and values. Reforming these laws isn’t just about updating outdated practices; it’s about ensuring that citizenship reflects a real connection to Italy and preserves the integrity of the Popolo. It’s a call to make citizenship not just a legal status, but a meaningful affirmation of belonging.
The Constitutional Boundaries of Citizenship: Safeguarding Sovereignty and Democratic Integrity
The scope attributed to the personal element of citizenship profoundly affects the quality of democratic processes, impacting both ordinary legislative functions and constitutional revision mechanisms. The methods by which citizenship is granted can significantly influence, and potentially distort, the functioning of institutional frameworks, ultimately jeopardising citizens’ fundamental right to participate in shaping national policies.
For instance, it would be unequivocally unconstitutional to introduce legislation excluding individuals born or residing in a specific region of the Country from citizenship. Such a provision would not only violate the principle of the unity and indivisibility of the Republic—understood not merely as a territorial entity but also in its personal dimension—but would also conflict with the foundational concepts of Popolo and citizenship, which are presupposed by the Italian Constitution.
Equally, it is evident that granting Italian citizenship to individuals entirely disconnected from the nation, such as anyone born in a specific area of the world, would be constitutionally unacceptable. While this scenario may not directly contravene the principle of the Republic’s indivisibility, it would undoubtedly result in a profound distortion of the notions of Popolo and citizenship. Arbitrarily recognising citizenship for individuals born in distant regions unrelated to the Italian national territory would seriously undermine the sovereign rights of the Italian people and dilute the democratic legitimacy of the nation.
Thus, it must be categorically affirmed that the concepts of Popolo and citizenship in the Constitution are not empty constructs subject to the unfettered discretion of the legislator. These notions are foundational pillars of the constitutional framework, requiring a careful balance to ensure their application remains aligned with the principles of unity, sovereignty, and democratic participation that define the Italian Republic.
The constitutional oversight of provisions related to the recognition and loss of citizenship is not only well-established but also vital to safeguarding constitutional legitimacy and democratic principles. This oversight is so foundational that it is resistant even to constitutional revision processes. Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Italian Constitution, which declares that “sovereignty belongs to the people,” has been aptly described as a “supernorm” or a “concise synthesis of all democratic principles,” underscoring its central role within the constitutional framework.
Significantly, the Constitution refers to Italy rather than the “Italian State” when associating the notions of Popolo and sovereignty. This wording reveals a broader scope, extending beyond mere institutional functions to embrace the spiritual identity of the nation and the horizontal dimension of the national community. This approach establishes an intrinsic link between citizenship and nationality, highlighting the importance of shared language, cultural traditions, and historical heritage in defining the concept of citizenship.
From a legal perspective, the term popolazione (population) typically refers to the individuals residing in a state’s territory or subject to its authority at a given time. In contrast, the term Popolo (the people) has a metalegal dimension, referring to a collective united by common attributes such as nationality, culture, customs, and traditions. The Popolo is thus identified as a group bound by shared cultural, social, and institutional ties.
This perspective introduces the horizontal dimension of citizenship, which is rooted in active participation in the life and governance of the community. This idea, originating in Aristotle’s concept of the polites in ancient Athens, has profoundly influenced modern theories of citizenship. Beginning with the French Revolution, citizenship has been regarded as a unifying force that integrates individuals into a community, both socially and politically.
Citizenship is not merely a legal construct but a reflection of a deep, mutual bond between individuals and their national community. It weaves together the institutional relationship with the state and the shared cultural, social, and historical identity of a people. This interplay makes citizenship a vital thread in the fabric of Italy’s democratic and cultural identity, sustaining both the unity of the Popolo and the legitimacy of the nation’s institutions.
Citizenship, People, and Territory: Redefining National Belonging Beyond Ancestral Ties and Democratic Sovereignty
Citizenship fundamentally presupposes the concept of Popolo, a collective social group that defines the contours and boundaries of national identity. However, legal frameworks governing citizenship must be rooted in constitutional principles that articulate the relationship between Popolo, national community, and the democratic state. This relationship is intrinsically tied to the notion of territory, as highlighted by the Constitutional Court, which considers the stable settlement of citizens within a defined geographical space a core element of statehood.
Granting citizenship based solely on ancestral ties, particularly to emigrants who left Italy in the 19th century, raises significant concerns. The tenuous connection to a distant ancestor, devoid of linguistic, cultural, or territorial links, cannot be justified under Article 35 of the Constitution, which recognises the right to emigrate and protects the rights of Italian workers abroad. While this provision safeguards the rights of those who actively engage with the Italian community, it does not extend to the recognition of citizenship for descendants several generations removed, with no substantive connection to the nation.
This reliance on ius sanguinis also creates an asymmetry within the broader framework of citizenship acquisition. Other criteria for obtaining citizenship—such as residency or cultural integration—require a demonstrable and progressive relationship with the country. By contrast, ius sanguinis in its current form bypasses such substantive links, allowing citizenship to be conferred on individuals who lack any meaningful connection to Italy beyond a formal ancestral lineage.
Article 29 of the Italian Constitution, which defines the family as a social reality rooted in genuine familial bonds, further reinforces the inadequacy of ancestral descent as the sole criterion for citizenship. The Constitutional Court has consistently rejected interpretations that rely exclusively on blood ties, emphasising the need for a dynamic understanding of family as a social institution reflecting the evolution of societal norms. Similarly, citizenship should be grounded in active and substantial connections to the national community, rather than tenuous formalistic criteria.
This imbalance becomes even more evident when juxtaposed with the implications of Article 48 of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees the right to participate in political life as a cornerstone of citizenship. Extending citizenship indiscriminately to individuals with no tangible connection to Italy risks distorting the democratic process, as these individuals may exercise rights, such as voting, without any lived experience or engagement with the Italian state.
Ultimately, citizenship laws must strike a balance between historical continuity and contemporary relevance. While recognising Italy’s commitment to its emigrant heritage, reforms are necessary to ensure that citizenship reflects genuine ties to the nation’s cultural, social, and territorial identity. This redefinition is essential for preserving the integrity of the Popolo as both a constitutional and social construct, safeguarding the principles upon which the Italian Republic is founded.
A central concern lies in the potential disruption of constitutional processes, including referenda under Article 138 of the Constitution, where the integrity of popular sovereignty is paramount. The indiscriminate extension of citizenship introduces individuals into the democratic process who may lack any meaningful engagement with the Italian State. This undermines the balance between rights and responsibilities inherent in citizenship, creating an inequitable system where political power is conferred on a population that neither resides within Italy nor contributes to its public finances, contravening the principle of no taxation without representation.
Internationally, the principle of “effective nationality,” as articulated by the International Court of Justice, requires citizenship to reflect a genuine connection between the individual and the state. Italy’s reliance on a genealogical link—often tracing back several generations—fails to meet this standard, as it does not demand evidence of cultural, linguistic, or territorial ties. Citizenship, in this context, becomes a formal entitlement disconnected from the substantive relationships that define national belonging.
While the application of a “pure” criterion of descent might be constitutionally tolerable if applied to a limited number of cases, its indiscriminate use for millions of individuals fundamentally disrupts the democratic framework. By granting voting rights and political representation to a vast population with no active role in Italian society, the system risks compromising the integrity of democratic governance. This imbalance is further exacerbated by the disproportionate influence these individuals could exert on constitutional referenda, undermining the principle of popular sovereignty enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution.
Reforming the ius sanguinis framework seems to be ab essential step forward according to Gattuso, to align it with constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as required under Article 3 of the Constitution. Introducing generational limits, residency requirements, or proof of active cultural or linguistic ties would preserve Italy’s historical commitment to its diaspora while ensuring that citizenship reflects genuine and meaningful connections to the nation. This recalibration is vital not only to safeguard the integrity of Italy’s democratic processes but also to uphold the enduring significance of citizenship as a bond between individuals and their community.
Italian Citizenship and EU Benefits: Rethinking the Ius Sanguinis Framework
Acquiring Italian citizenship does not simply grant access to the rights and privileges of the Italian state; it also confers European Union citizenship, unlocking a suite of significant benefits. These include the freedom to move, work, and reside across member states, political participation in both local and European elections, and access to protections and opportunities unavailable to non-EU nationals. However, this dual status raises critical questions about the criteria for Italian citizenship, particularly when extended under the expansive ius sanguinis framework.
Italy’s approach, which allows descendants of Italian emigrants—even several generations removed—to claim citizenship, directly impacts the European Union as a whole. By granting EU citizenship through Italian ancestry, the system potentially introduces millions of new EU citizens with no substantive ties to Italy or any other member state. These individuals gain the full benefits of European citizenship without necessarily contributing to the fiscal, cultural, or social fabric of the Union. This creates a dissonance between the rights conferred and the responsibilities that underpin them.
The implications of this system are far-reaching. For the Union, it means an expansion of the European citizenry that might lack genuine connections to any EU state. These new citizens could utilise their rights for economic or political purposes in other member states, potentially bypassing the social contract that EU citizenship is meant to embody. For example, freedom of movement, a cornerstone of the Union, could become a tool for individuals to access economic advantages in other countries without ever participating in the community life or contributing to the societies of their new residence.
The relationship between national citizenship laws and European Union obligations is a profound reflection of the tension between state sovereignty and the integrity of the Union’s principles. Italy’s application of ius sanguinis, extending citizenship to millions of descendants with no effective connection to the state, raises fundamental questions about proportionality, fairness, and the coherence of European citizenship as a unified concept.
At the heart of this issue is Article 117 of the Italian Constitution, which provides the national legislator with autonomy in defining the criteria for citizenship. Yet, this autonomy is bound by Italy’s international and European obligations. The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly tie EU citizenship to national citizenship. This derivative nature creates a shared responsibility: while states determine who qualifies as a citizen, the resulting EU citizenship grants rights that impact the Union as a whole. Thus, an overly expansive national policy, such as Italy’s current ius sanguinis framework, risks undermining the integrity of the Union and creating asymmetries in the application of EU rights.
The landmark Micheletti case underscores the delicate interplay between national and EU laws. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that member states cannot impose additional requirements on the recognition of citizenship conferred by another state. This decision reflects the principle of mutual respect among member states. Yet, it also highlights the importance of proportionality and the need to ensure that national citizenship laws align with the broader objectives of the EU. In this light, the Italian model, which grants citizenship to individuals several generations removed from Italy, challenges the principle of “effective nationality” that underpins the notion of genuine connection between an individual and a state.
The implications of this approach extend beyond theoretical legal debates. By granting citizenship—and consequently EU citizenship—to individuals who may never have set foot in Italy, the current system creates practical challenges. These individuals gain access to the rights and protections afforded by EU citizenship, including freedom of movement, political participation, and social benefits, without any meaningful contribution or connection to the Italian or European communities. This discrepancy risks fostering resentment among member states and citizens who bear the burdens of these rights through their tax contributions and active participation in the Union’s governance.
From a personal perspective, this situation highlights the importance of citizenship as more than a legal status. Citizenship should be a reflection of belonging—a shared commitment to the values, culture, and responsibilities of a community. The current Italian approach dilutes this fundamental principle, transforming citizenship into a mere entitlement based on ancestral ties. While I deeply respect the historical bonds Italy shares with its diaspora, I believe that citizenship should not be granted without ensuring a genuine and substantive connection to the state.
Reforming the Italian ius sanguinis framework is not about severing ties with the past but about aligning citizenship policies with contemporary realities. Introducing limits—such as generational caps or residency requirements—would preserve Italy’s commitment to its diaspora while ensuring that citizenship reflects meaningful engagement with the nation. Such reforms would also demonstrate Italy’s respect for its European obligations, fostering trust among member states and reinforcing the integrity of EU citizenship.
Ultimately, citizenship must strike a balance between heritage and present-day responsibility. It should honour the ties that connect individuals to their ancestral homeland while reflecting the active role citizens play in shaping the democratic, cultural, and social fabric of their communities. Italy’s citizenship policies have the potential to set a benchmark for how nations can embrace their history while building a cohesive and forward-looking future within the European Union.
A Critical Turning Point: Rethinking Italian Citizenship Laws in Light of Constitutional Challenges
The conclusions drawn in the ordinance of Judge Marco Gattuso underscore the profound constitutional issues raised by Italy’s ius sanguinis framework as articulated in Article 1 of Law no. 91 of 1992. At the core of the matter is the principle that citizenship is automatically conferred upon the descendants of Italian citizens, regardless of generational distance or substantive ties to Italy. This provision has been deemed potentially incompatible with Articles 1, 3, and 117 of the Constitution, as well as relevant European Union treaties, due to the lack of limitations or conditions that ensure an effective and meaningful connection to the Italian state.
The relevance of this constitutional question is highlighted by the specific case at hand. The twelve applicants, all residents of Brazil, claim citizenship based solely on their descent from a single Italian ancestor who lived in the 19th century. Their connection to Italy is tenuous at best, with no demonstrated ties to the nation’s culture, language, or society. This situation exemplifies the broader challenge posed by an unrestricted application of ius sanguinis: the risk of granting citizenship to individuals who are functionally detached from the national community.
Judge Gattuso suggests a reasonable compromise, proposing that ius sanguinis be limited to two generations, with exceptions for individuals who can prove a significant connection to Italy, such as residency for a minimum of two years. This approach balances the historical and cultural significance of the Italian diaspora with the need for a modern, constitutionally compliant framework that reflects genuine ties to the state.
The suspension of the case and its referral to the Constitutional Court highlight the importance of addressing this issue at the highest level. The decision will have profound implications not only for Italy’s citizenship policies but also for its obligations as a member of the European Union. The automatic granting of EU citizenship through Italian ancestry must align with the principles of proportionality, fairness, and effectiveness to preserve the integrity of both national and European citizenship.
This moment offers Italy an opportunity to reform its citizenship laws in a way that honours its historical legacy while safeguarding the democratic, cultural, and social fabric of the nation. By introducing generational limits or requiring evidence of meaningful connections, Italy can ensure that its citizenship policies are both equitable and forward-looking, upholding constitutional principles while respecting its place within the European Union. The Constitutional Court’s forthcoming decision will mark a pivotal step in this ongoing dialogue, shaping the future of Italian and European citizenship for generations to come.
Final considerations
Judge Marco Gattuso has proposed a focused and pragmatic reform to address the constitutional concerns raised by the current ius sanguinis framework. He suggests limiting the recognition of Italian citizenship to descendants within the first two generations, with an exception for those who can demonstrate a tangible connection to Italy through proof that they or their immediate ancestors resided in the country for at least two years. This proposal aims to ensure that Italian citizenship retains its historical significance while also reflecting meaningful ties to the nation. By setting generational boundaries and requiring evidence of residency, this approach would address the risk of granting citizenship to individuals with no cultural, linguistic, or territorial links to Italy. It offers a balanced solution, preserving the spirit of ius sanguinis while aligning with constitutional principles of proportionality and fairness. This reform not only safeguards the integrity of Italian citizenship but also ensures its compatibility with broader European Union obligations, reinforcing the importance of genuine connections between citizens and the state. Judge Gattuso’s suggestion represents a critical step toward modernising Italy’s citizenship laws in a way that honours its rich emigrant legacy while meeting the practical demands of the present.
